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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the interplay between economic growth and fertility as an economy moves 
through two distinct phases: women raising children full time; women entering the work force and 
raising children part time. 
Womens relative wages rise with economic growth, as per Galor and Weil (96). Higher wages make 
children more affordable. On the other hand, children are more costly when maternal time, used in 
child rearing, could be supplied to the labor market. 
I extend Galor and Weil (96) by introducing goods and services as a child rearing input. A Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function for child rearing allows for varying degrees of 
substitutability between goods and time. 
The existence of an alternative input to maternal time generates a baby boom-bust cycle: fertility rises 
in the first phase and falls in the second. Whilst fertility declines unambiguously at the beginning of the 
second phase, as women enter the labor force, it may bounce-back before reaching steady state as 
income effects start dominate. 
JEL J11, J13, H24, 040 
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1 Introduction 
 
There has been a recent surge of theoretical literature linking changes in fertility to 
economic growth.  Despite often acknowledging a non-monotonic interplay as 
empirically valid, the existing literature predicts a strictly negative relationship 
between fertility and income per capita in developed economies that have progressed 
beyond the Malthusian poverty trap where subsistence incomes limit fertility.   
 
This literature is motivated by the much-publicized decline in fertility in most OECD 
countries in the latter half of the 20th century, following the post-war ‘baby-boom’.  
This paper explores reasons why we might expect the ‘baby-bust’ to be followed by a 
rise in fertility rates – a ‘baby bounce-back’ – principally because of the increasing 
use of child-care goods and services that reduce demands on parental time.  This 
paper also explores the implications of child-care subsidies for the evolution of 
fertility. 
 
Common to recent endogenous fertility models is the idea that growth in income per 
capita raises the opportunity cost of time spent raising children.  In a developed 
economy, this effect dominates the increased affordability of children, so that fertility 
declines.  As a slight variation on this theme, Becker, Murphy et al. (1990) and 
Ehrlich and Lui (1991) introduce a child quantity – quality tradeoff.  In this case, 
fertility declines with economic growth because the opportunity cost of time spent 
raising children increases relative to the opportunity cost of time spent educating 
children. 
 
Models endogenising fertility may be differentiated according to how children enter 
into parental utility.  Self-interested parents may view children as a consumption item 
(Galor and Weil (1996)) or as a source of income support in old age (Ehrlich and Lui 
(1991; Cigno and Rosati (1996)).  Alternatively, parents may be altruistic (Barro and 
Becker (1988), Becker, Murphy et al. (1990)).   
 
The model of Galor and Weil (1996) has several advantages over its counterparts.   
Firstly, parents derive direct utility from the number of children, simplifying analysis 
without altering any empirically valid predictions.1  Secondly, a rise in female relative 
wages drives the fertility decline.2  Intuitively, when children are a consumption item, 
higher wages have both an income effect and a substitution effect, when labor is used 
to rear children.  These effects work in opposite directions.  By construct, the 
substitution effect dominates.  Specifically, if maternal time is the only child rearing 
input and female wages are a fraction of male wages, fertility unambiguously declines 
as female relative wages rise.  Finally, rising female relative wages is a consequence 
of economic growth.  Women supply only one type of labor that is complementary to 
capital.  Both male and female wages rise over time with the accumulation of capital 
per worker, but female wages rise relatively more.  Combined with the neoclassical 
                                                 
1 After making the necessary extensions, Day (2001) finds economic growth, via rising female relative 
wages, generates a fertility decline in all three models of parental utility. 
2 In most developed countries the decline in fertility since 1960 corresponded to a steady rise in the 
female-male wage ratio.  Cigno and Rosati (1996) present empirical evidence for US, UK, Germany 
and Italy.   
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capital intensity effect, this final feature generates a feedback loop between growth in 
output per worker and declining fertility.  Growth in capital per worker raises female 
relative wages, inducing a decline in fertility that, in turn, boosts capital per worker.  
Thus, Galor and Weil (1996) encapsulate in one model fertility decline as both a 
symptom and cause of economic growth. 
 
In addition, Galor and Weil (1996) define two phases of demographic development: 
initially, women are at home full time; in the second phase, women participate in the 
paid labor force.  Fertility declines with growth in income per capita only once 
women have entered the labor force.  Throughout the initial phase, fertility is 
constant. 
 
Does this predicted negative monotonic relationship between fertility and growth 
accord with data for a developed economy?  Referring to Figure 1, two anomalies 
present: 
 
Firstly, fertility decline in leading developed economies (the G5 group) has become 
less pronounced in the last few decades.  Fertility levels have virtually leveled off.  In 
the US, there is evidence of a slight upturn in fertility since 1985, despite the gender 
wage gap continuing to fall (see Figure 2). 
 
A footnote in Galor and Weil (1996) offers a way of reconciling the model with 
recent data for developed economies.  If goods are also required to raise children, 
fertility decline due to rising female relative wages may be eradicated if the goods 
input is sufficiently large or, as restated in Apps and Rees (2001), the time input is 
sufficiently small.  This raises the question: what factors determine the goods-time 
input mix?  The obvious implication is that if goods and services are increasingly 
substituted for maternal time then, over time, fertility will become less sensitive to 
rising female relative wages and may even increase.  Despite introducing goods as a 
child rearing input, neither paper is able to investigate the implications of the degree 
of complementarity between goods and maternal time.  Galor and Weil (1996) assume 
a fixed quantity of goods.  Apps and Rees (2001) introduce a generic production 
function for child rearing.  But neither paper analyses the dynamics of fertility in the 
context of a child-rearing production function.   
 
Secondly, fertility rose over the 1950’s – the so-called “baby boom” which is evident 
in Figure 1.  Galor and Weil (1996) predict constant fertility throughout a phase when 
married women allocate all of their time endowment to child rearing.  This prediction 
follows directly from the assumption that a fixed fraction of maternal time is the only 
input into child rearing.  This raises the question, would flexibility over the child 
rearing input mix alone enable fertility to rise with household income in the 
theoretical model? 
 
That below replacement fertility is currently observed in all G5 countries bar the 
United States, has perhaps biased developments in theory in favor of explanations for 
fertility decline.  Just as we would not want theory of the 1960’s to have been unduly 
influenced by the preceding baby boom, we do not want recent experience to blind us 
to the possibility of a resurgence of fertility in developed economies. 
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Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate (births per woman) 
1
2
3
4
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
1
2
3
4
G5 (non US) United States
Per cent Per cent
 
Source: World Bank Tables; Historical Statistics of the US 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Female/Male Earnings Ratio (US)3 
ted in the Current 
 
revious efforts to model a non-monotonic relationship between fertility and income 
 
 
elevant to Figure 1 is a model that tracks an advanced economy’s transition through 
his paper presents a model that generates the non-monotonic relationship between 
fertility and GDP per capita, observed in developed economies over the last few 
decades.  It does so without drawing on outdated Malthusian assumptions.  I extend 
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P
per capita track an economy through various stages of development.  Becker, Murphy
et al. (1990), Ehrlich and Lui (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) predict a rise 
in fertility at very low levels of capital per person.  Kremer (1993) introduces a non-
monotonic relationship by assumption.  He postulates, but stops short of introducing,
extensions to his Malthusian model that would generate the assumed relationship.  
 
R
two demographic phases distinguished by female labor force participation, as in Galor 
and Weil (1996), rather than stages of purely economic development. 
 
T
 
3Since 1970, the gender wage gap has fallen in other G5 countries: see Blau and Kahn (2000).  
Harkness and Waldfogel (1999) report female-male hourly earnings ratios for US and Europe, 1967-
1995.  Blau and Kahn (2000) also report earnings corrected for differences in weekly hours worked, 
albeit for a shorter period.  The gender gap in wages mimics that in earnings. 
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Galor and Weil (1996) by introducing goods and services as a child rearing input and
allowing the household to choose the optimal goods-time input mix.  A Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function for child rearing allows analysis
of the degree of complementarity between goods and time. 
 
2 Basic structure of the model 
 
 
 live for three periods describes the 
ildren, consuming time, as well as 
oods and services, from their parents; the second period of life supplying labor to the 
o generate a gender wage differential, I employ the assumption of Galor and Weil 
r in their wage earning ability because of different labor 
ndowments.    
 
An overlapping generations model in which people
economy.  People spend the first period of life as ch
g
market and raising children; and the third period in retirement, when they consume 
the proceeds of their savings from the previous period.  The closed economy identity 
of savings and investment provides the link with growth in productivity and wages. 
 
Production of final output 
 
T
(1996): men and women diffe
e
 
Physical capital (K), physical labor L ( ptL ) and mental labor (
m
tL ) are factors of 
production, all with non-increasing marginal products.  The greater the capital-labor 
tio in the economy, the more highly rewarded mental labor relative to physical 
se l l d 
≠  (1) 
d )
ra
labor.  This is consistent with relative ri  in rewards to menta abor in develope
countries.  Intuitively, capital does a better job of replacing human strength than 
human thinking. 
 
The production function is  
 
1/
(1 )( ) 0m pt t t tY A K L bL
ρρ ρα α ρ = + − + 
c al labor, physical 
la l labor. 
where A>0, b>0, (0,1)α ∈ an ( ,1ρ ∈ −∞
 
Since each household supplies one unit of physical labor, the production function, 
homogeneous of degree 1, in terms of per working age household is given
. The separability of the production function 
aptures the assumption that, whereas, capital complements ment
bor is neither a complement nor a substitute for capital or menta
 by: 
 (1 )t t t t ty Y L A k m bα α= = + − +   
where kt and mt are the per household supplies of capital and mental labor, 
1/p ρρρ 
re and 1 unit of mental 
la  labor, so mental labor 
(2) 
spectively.  Men supply inelastically 1 unit of physical labor 
bor together. Women supply between 0 and 1 units of mental
emale 
                                                
per working age household takes values: 1<mt<2., where (mt –1) measures f
labor force participation.4 
 
Profit maximization and competitive markets imply: 
 
4 The crucial assumption here is that men and women are equally endowed with “brains” but only men 
have “brawn”. 
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 (1 ) (1t t tw A m kα α α= − + −
1 /1 )m tm
ρ ρρ ρρ −−  
 
  (3) 
 (4) 
An increase in capital intensity will therefore raise the wage5 for mental labor ( ) 
while the wage for physical labor ( ) is constant. Men earn a wage of +
women earn a wage of . It fo at growth in the capita
increase female wages proportionately more than male wages, thus reducing the 
zation 
irectly from the number of children.  Children are 
ssentially a durable good. There is no bequest motive. 
t
p
tw b=
t
m p
mw
; pw
llows th
t t t
m
t
gender wage gap. 
 
Household optimi
w
l stock over time will 
w
w
 
Households derive utility d
e
 
The household utility function is: 
 1ln( ) (1 ) ln( )t tu n cγ γ += + − 6
c ousehold at time t.7     
 (5) 
ment and  denotes pairs of children (since the 
ouples is the basic unit of analysis), both chosen by the h
 
raction of maternal time, denoted 
where c  is consumption in retire1t+ tn
 
To raise each pair of children, households expend both goods and services8 and a
f xˆ  and , respectively.   
a ty cost of female labor is 
wer.  Men allocate their labor endowment to paid work only.  This paper models the 
 
ime. 
met: 
) 
he production function for child-care is of CE
zˆ
 
Only the wife raises children, ˆ tzn ≤ , bec use the opportuni1
economy’s transition through the Baby Boom to Bust of the latter half of the twentieth
century.  Neither era saw men withdrawing from the labor force to supplement 
women at home raising children full time.  Even the arrival of “Mr. Mom” in the 
modern era involved substitution for, rather than supplementation of, maternal t
For the purposes of this paper, therefore, it is assumed9 the following condition is 
 ˆ 1tzn ≤  (6
 
lo
T S form: 
 1 2( ) ( ) ;
a a a
t t tn z x aα α = + 
1
0≠  (7) 
                                                 
5 This is the real wage, with the price of the aggregate good normalized to 1. 
6 Because of the log linear specification, demand for children will be independent of the price for 
retirement consumption and vice versa.  Consumption in the second period of life is assumed to be 
zero. Galor and Weil (1996) note that if couples had log utility from ct, the equation of motion would 
be altered only by a multiplicative constant. 
7 The model structure up to this point corresponds to Galor and Weil (96).  The analysis from this point 
is the original work of the author. 
8 Such goods and services could range from disposable nappies and convenience food to household 
appliances and child-care services. 
9 To ensure that women enter the workforce, Galor and Weil (1996) assume γ<1/2.  By implication, the 
household’s optimal choice of fertility satisfies condition (6).  The approach taken in this paper differs 
in that parameter values in the household optimization problem are not restricted so as to rule out the 
scenario where optimizing households would use child-rearing time in excess of the maternal time 
endowment if they could. 
 6
where a determines the constant elasticity of substitution between time and goods, 
iven by ε = 1/1−a.  Define  and .  δ 
 functio  
es 
sed in fixed proportions. 
Becaus ogeneous of degree one, the 
ousehold optimization problem can be solved in two stages.  The household first 
e 
sibility of a government subsidy (
g is the distribution 1/ aα δ=1 2
parameter that measures the relative factor shares in production.  The limits of the 
CES child-rearing production n are:
• as 1δ → , the assumption of Galor and Weil (1996) that child rearing requir
only time input;10 
1/(1 ) aα δ= −
• as , a Leontief technology, where child-care goods and services and 
maternal time are u
0ε →
 
e the child-rearing production function is hom
h
chooses, for a given nt, the cost minimizing input mix and then chooses nt, given th
efficient input mix, so as to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. 
 
Cost minimization 
 
Allowing for the pos 0 1tβ≤ <
 (1 )mt t t t tC w z xβ= + −  (8
where x and z denote total goods/services and time input, respe
) per unit of market 
oods and services used11, the total cost of rearing children is: 
) 
ctively. 
n whether the 
aternal time constraint, (6), is binding,  
, for a given nt, so as to minimize (8) subject 
 (7), assuming, for the moment, the maternal time constraint (6) is not binding.  
g
 
There are two cases, constrained (c) and unconstrained (u), depending o
m
 
The household first chooses the input mix
to
Input demands for time and goods are, respectively, 
 ( ) ( ) t (9) 
a a
1// 1 / 1* / 1 1/ 1
1 2ˆ / 1 / ( ) ( )
aa au a am a a m a
t t t tz zn w w nα β α α
−
−
−
− − − 
= = + −    1 t
 tn  (10) ( ) ( ) 1// 1 / 1* / 1 1/ 11 2 2ˆ / 1 / ( ) (1 )aa au a am at t t t tx xn w α β α α β−− − − − − = = + − −  
 
The unconstrained per unit cost function is 
  (11) 
When (6) is binding, and the required goods input, xt, is derived by 
verting equation (7). 
, the household’s first period and second period budget 
onstraints are, respectively: 
                                                
 ( )1( , ) /t t tp w wβ α=  ( )
1// 1 / 1
21 /
a aa a a am m
tβ α
−
−
− + −
 
* ˆ 1ct tz zn= =
 
Utility maximization 
in
 
When (6) is not binding
c
 
E10 In the limit, , where E is the level of production technology, analogous to A in (1).  
Replacing the restriction E=1 with E>1 ensures 0 1 . 
ˆ 1/z =
zˆ< <
11 The price of goods and services is normalized to 1.  It is assumed the subsidy is financed by a tax on 
old age consumption.  See second period budget constraint below. 
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 ( , ) 2m p mt t t t t tp w n s w wβ + ≤ +  
 
(12) 
1+  (13)
12 
here rt+1 denotes the rate of return on savings, st , τt+1 d
ld age consumption and w is the coupl
es nt and c  to 12), (13), yielding: 
1 1(1 )(1 )t t t tc s r τ+ += + −
o e’s income. 
w enotes the rate of taxation on 
 ˆ(2 )m pw zn− +  t t t
 
The household then choos maximize (5) subject to (t+1
( 2p mu
t
w wγ +
=
)
 t  (15) 
hen (6) is binding, the household’s first period budget
 
 *
( , )
t t
t mn p w β  (14) 
* (1 )( 2 )    u p mt ts w wγ= − +
W  constraint is: 
 
 ˆ(1 ) m pxn s w wβ− + ≤ +
In e labor endowment to raise 
t t t t t
 
 (16) 
tuitively, when the wife is restricted to using her entir
hildren, the husband is the sole income earner.  His earnings are then allocated 
 
c
between goods used in child rearing and savings.   
 
Maximizing (5) subject to (13) and (16) yields: 
 * ˆ
(1
t
t tx xn= =
−
( )
)
m p
c t
t
w wγ
β
+  (17) 
 
 *
ˆ
(1 )( ) (1 )
ˆ
c m p m p
t t t t t t
xs w w w w
z
γ β= − + = + − −  (18) 
When , substituting from (17) into the CES production function for child 
aring, each household produces: 
 
 ˆ 1tzn =
 
1
*cn α
=
re
1 2
( )
(1 )
a am p
a t t
t
t
w wγ
α β
 + +  
−   
 (19) 
Dynamic system 
orking age couple fuels growth in this model.  The capital stock in 
ach period is determined by the saving of the working age households in the previous 
working age households at time t+1 is 
                                                
 
 
Capital stock per w
e
period, so that 
 *1t t tK L s+ =  (20) 
The number of 
 *L  (21) 1 1t t t t+ +
Capital stock per household is therefore given by: 
pL L n= =
 
12 The rate of subsidy and taxation are set so as to satisfy the balanaced-budget constraint: 
[ ]1 1 1ˆ (1 )t t t t t t t t 1xn n L s r Lβ − − − −= + τ .  Although endogenous at the aggregate level, the rate of subsidy 
and taxation is treated as exogenous by each individual household. 
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1 *
1
t
t
k
L n+ +
= =
*
1t tK s+ 
t
 (22) 
From (22), an equation of motion 1 ( )t tk kφ+ =
termined b
is obtained, since both household 
f kt.   
 Galor and Weil (1996) capital per household evolves through two phases 
 
 
through 
he evolution of capital stock per household is governed by two distinct equations of 
hildren full time ) ; and, then  
hildren
 
terdependence of wage for mental labor and capital per couple in Phase 2 
he derivation of the equation of motion for Phase 2 is complicated by the fact that 
, 
 wage 
hen , noting that  
 
savings and fertility choices are de y mw , which in turn is a function o
 
t
In
distinguished by female labor force participation.  In the initial phase, women allocate
their entire labor endowment to child rearing.  Once capital per household reaches a 
sufficiently high level, women enter the paid labor force, marking the transition to the
second phase.  This paper has similar phases in respect of female labor force 
participation, but a different predicted path of fertility as the economy moves 
the two phases. 
 
T
motion, as the economy moves first through 
• Phase1: women are at home, raising c *( 1ctz =
• Phase 2: women participate in the labor force, raising c  part 
time *( 1)uz ≤ . t
In
 
T
the wage for mental labor and time spent raising children are interdependent.  By (3)
m
tw  is a function of mt, which in turn is a function of ˆ tzn .  That is, the wage paid to 
ntal labor reflects it marginal product, affected by household supply of mental 
labor, which in turn depends on the time spent raising children.  As previously 
demonstrated, ˆ tzn  is a function of 
m
tw : time spent raising children falls with the
for mental labor when women are in the labor force.  Thus, we need obtain an implicit 
function for ˆ tzn  when ˆ 1tzn < . 
 
me
 ˆ 1tzn <W
ˆ(2 ) ˆ2
m
t t t
t tp
t t
L L znm z
L L
−
= = = − n  (23) 
and substituting from (3), (14) and (23) into (9),  
)  (24) 
et .  Since
 ˆ ˆ( ,t t tzn f zn k=
L ) 0=  has continuous derivatives,  ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) 0t t t t tG zn k zn f zn k= − =
e Implicit Function Theorem,
t
ˆ( ,t tG zn k
0  then there
n(1t t
by th  if G ≠  is a differentiable and 
invertible function ϕ(k ) such that ˆ , ( ))zn k
ˆ tzn
mi ϕ=  where 
G f− ∂
ˆ
/ . /( ) 0 if / 0
ˆ1 / . / . /
t
t
m m
k mt t t
t tm m
zn t t t t t
w w kk f
G f w w m m zn
ϕ ∂ ∂ ∂′ = = < ∂ ∂ < −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 w  (25) 
 
ith the exception ofW  / mtf w∂ ∂
biguous.  Assigning a negative value to 
, signs of the partial derivatives in (25) are 
unam / mtf w∂ ∂  is tantamount to assuming that 
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the female labor supply curve is never backward bending.  The possibility 
backward bending supply curve arises in this m ince, as we shall see, fertility 
may rise with female relative wages in Phase 2.  A backward bending labor supply 
curve would occur if the proportionate rise in number of children exceeds the 
proportionate fall in time input per child.  For the purposes of this paper, 
/ 0mtf w∂ ∂ < is assumed.13 
 
), as the eco
of a 
odel, s
my grows in transition to steady state, time spent raising 
ren falls even when an input substitutable for maternal time exists.14   
g e couple 
en raise children full time.  That is,  
) 
Equation of motion 
, (19) into (22) and using the definition of k*, the 
, therefore,  
Thus, by (25
child
r which wom
 
3 
 
no
1 ( )t tk kφ+ =
 mtw = 
By (28), mtw
rst order no
                              
 
The economy enters Phase 2 once a sufficiently high level of capital per couple has 
been accumulated.  Let k* denote the highest level of capital per workin  ag
fo
 
*
*
( ) (0,1]          for     ˆ
1                             fo
t t
t
k k k
zn
ϕ ∈ ≥
= 
 (26
r     tk k≤
Substituting from (14), (15) and (18)
equation of motion for the system is
 11
( , )                                          if     *
*
m
t t
t t
t
p w k k
K sk
β
γ
+
+
 ≥
= = = 
1
1
ˆ* 1 ˆˆ (1 )  (1 )  if     *
ˆ
m pt t
t t t t t
N n xz w w x k k
z
γ
γβ β
γ
+
−
−  + − − = − <   
 (27) 
Capital stock per couple evolves from a historically given initial stock according to 
 
, which is readily derived from (27) by substituting for: 
k
 (28) 
 is a non-linear function of kt.  It follows that the equation of motion is a 
n-linear difference equation, kt+1 = φ(kt).15 
                  
( ) ( ) 1 /1
1 /
(1 ) 2 ( ) (1 ) 2 ( )    if     *t t t tA k k k k k
ρ ρρ ρρ
ρ ρ
α ϕ α α ϕ
−
−
−
  
− − + − − ≥  
(1 ) (1 )                                             if     *t tA k k
ρα α α − + − < 
 
fi
 
13 A backward bending female labor supply, although an interesting proposition in itself, adds an 
unnecessary layer of complication to the model. 
14 When a fixed fraction of time per child is the only input, total time spent raising children necessarily 
falls as the economy grows.  See Galor and Weil (96). 
15 The log linear specification for household utility function ensures the equation is first order since 
fertility is a function of own price.  Should fertility be a function of the real interest rate, a higher order 
equation would be obtained. 
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3.1 Properties 
 
Curvature 
 
By enabling nt to change, the introduction of a CES production function for child 
rearing complicates the analysis of the curvature of the equation of motion. 
 
Recall that capital per household at t+1 equals savings per household (st) divided by 
household fertility (nt).  If time is the only input or fixed quantities of time and goods 
are used in child rearing, nt is necessarily constant in Phase 1.  Consequently, capital 
per household follows the path of household savings.  st increases one for one with the 
wage for mental labor.  Hence, φ(kt) is concave (convex) if the wage for mental labor 
increases at a decreasing (increasing) rate as capital per household accumulates.  
Referring to the Appendix, if the degree of complementarity between capital and 
mental labor is relatively low, then  is increasing and concave in kmtw t over the 
interval (0, k*). 
 
When goods are substitutable for time, both nt and st increase with the wage for 
mental labor.  nt  rises less than st , proportionate to the increase in the efficient goods 
input.  Capital per household therefore follows the path of the goods input per pair of 
children.  As a result, the concavity (convexity) of φ(kt) also depends on how goods 
input per pair of children changes with the wage for mental labor. 
 
Proposition 1:  Given a low degree of complementarity between mental 
labor and capital, a low degree of complementarity between child-rearing goods and 
time is a sufficient condition for concavity of φ(kt) over the interval (0,k*). 
 
Proof  See Appendix 
 
Regardless of the elasticitiy of substitution between goods and time, goods input per 
pair of children rises with the total quantity of goods (see Appendix), which in turn 
rises with the wage for mental labor. Thus, ˆ( ) (1 ) / . . / 0m mt tk x x x w w kφ γ′ = − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ >
( ) 0tk
t t .  
Is the sign of the second order derivative also unambiguous?  Referring to Appendix, 
given an elasticity of substitution between mental labor and capital in excess of 1, an 
elasticity of substitution between child-care goods and time exceeding 0.5 
(corresponding to a > -1) is a sufficient condition for φ′′ < . 
 
The intuition for this result lies in diminishing marginal returns.  Growth in kt raises 
the wage for mental labor, which in turn boosts the quantity of goods input per child.  
Input of mental labor is fixed to 1 in Phase1.  The wage (or marginal product) for 
mental labor increases at a decreasing rate when the degree of complementarity 
between mental labor and physical capital is relatively low.    Similarly, goods input 
per pair of children increases at a decreasing rate when the degree of complementarity 
between goods and time is relatively low. 
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Proposition 2:  φ(kt) is increasing and concave in kt over the interval 
 regardless of the degree of complementarity between goods and time in child 
rearing. 
( *, )k ∞
 
Proof 
 
Referring to (27), kt+1 is proportional to child rearing costs per pair of 
children, ( , )mtp w β .  By Euler’s Theorem, ˆ 0mtp w z= >∂ ∂ . Demand for maternal time 
input, given by (9) is downward sloping: 2 0 (m mt tw a< ∀ ∈ −∞2zˆ w p∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ,1) .   
Thus, the per unit child rearing cost function is increasing and strictly concave in the 
wage for mental labor, regardless of the degree of complementarity between goods 
and time.  Intuitively, an increase in the price of time input raises the per unit cost of 
child rearing, albeit at a decreasing rate as the household uses less and less time input. 
 
As in Galor and Weil (1996), the wage for mental labor is increasing and concave in 
capital per household.  Given (25), their proof is applicable. 
 
Discontinuity 
 
The equation of motion is discontinuous at k*.  Substituting (14) into (9), 
(1 )1 2 1ˆ 1 (1 )
(1 )
m
p m t
t t t t
t
wzn w w
εδγ β
γ γ δ β
 
−−
= ⇒ = + −  
− 
.  k* is readily obtained, after 
solving out for the wage for mental labor.  Equality of the two equations in (27) is not 
satisfied for kt = k*.  Specifically, equality of the two equations of motion occurs at a 
lower wage for mental labor: (1 )1 1 (1 )
(1 )
m
p m t
t t t
t
ww w
εδγ β
γ γ δ β
 
−−
= + −  
− 
, suggesting 
*( ) ( )tt k k t k kk k *tφ φ→ + → −>  given concavity of φ(kt) throughout both Phase 1 and Phase 2. 
 
For the intuition, first consider why the equation of motion is continuous in the 
limiting cases,  and .  In the case of fixed proportions, 1δ → 0ε →
ˆ1 2ˆ
ˆ
1p m
t1t t (1 )t
xzn
z
w wγ β= ⇒ −
γ γ
= +
− .  In the case of time input only, the last 
term in the implied equality vanishes.  In either case, equality of the two equations 
analogous to the system in (27) is satisfied for kt = k*.  Intuitively, an optimizing 
household takes child-rearing input(s) as given and chooses fertility so as to maximize 
utility.  On the cusp of Phase 2, the wage for mental labor (corresponding to k*) 
induces a utility maximizing household to choose fertility such that z*=1.  Continuity 
of the equation of motion at kt=k* is assured by the fact that the time input per child or 
the goods-time input ratio is, by assumption, fixed and therefore the same in Phase 1 
as in Phase 2. 
 
Allowing households to substitute child-care goods and services for time introduces 
another dimension to household decision-making.  In addition to choosing fertility so 
as to maximize utility, an optimizing household chooses the child-rearing input mix 
so as to minimize cost.  Once again, on the cusp of Phase 2, a utility maximizing 
household chooses fertility implying z*=1.  However, discontinuity in the equation of 
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motion at kt=k* arises because the goods-time input ratio throughout Phase 1 differs 
from the goods-input ratio upon entering Phase 2.  If the household cost minimizes 
throughout, why does this disparity arise?  Throughout Phase 1, cost minimization 
corresponds to a non-tangent corner solution.  Growth in the wage for mental labor 
does not affect the goods-time input mix required for a given number of children.  
However, total goods used (equivalent to goods-time input ratio when z*=1) increases 
with fertility due to a pure (male wage) income effect.  In Phase 2, cost minimization 
corresponds to a tangency point.  Growth in the wage for mental labor raises the 
goods-time input ratio required for any number of children.  The effect on fertility 
depends on competing substitution and (male and female) income effects. 
3.2 Steady state equilibria 
 
In steady state equilibrium, capital stock per household is stationary: ( )k kφ= . 
 
Existence 
 
A steady state exists if: 
• (0) 0φ > ; and 
• there exists some kt, such that ( )t tk kφ < .  
 
The first condition is indeed satisfied. Substituting from (17) into the equations for 
of (27) and (28) implies (0, *)tk k∈ { }1/ˆ(0) (1 ) (1 ) 0z a bρφ γ α= − − + > .16 
 
Ensuring ( )tk tkφ <  for some kt, (1 )lim '( ) lim 0
t t
m
t
t mk k
t t
wpk
w k
γφ
γ→∞ →∞
∂− ∂
= =
∂ ∂
, since ˆm
t
p z
w
∂
=
∂
 
is bounded below by zero and the equation for of (28), together with (25), 
imply
( *, )tk k∈ ∞
lim
tk →∞
0
m
t
t
w
k
∂
=
∂
.17 
 
( ) [0, *)t t tk k k kφ > ∀ ∈
( )tk
implies a steady state exists in Phase 2 rather than Phase 1.  
As in Galor and Weil (1996), we confine attention to this case. Thus, discontinuity of 
φ poses no problem for existence provided * *( ) ( )tt k k t k kk k tφ φ→ + → −> , which is 
satisfied, as required.  
                                                 
16 Apps and Rees (2002) instead show φ (0) >0 for the Phase 2 equation of motion.  Since the economy 
enters Phase 2 at a positive and sufficiently high level of kt (i.e. k*), the condition for existence is 
correctly obtained from the Phase1 equation of motion.  Their approach is correct if: 1. Phase 1 does 
not exist (amending their restriction to ; or 2. k*=0 : Phase 1 does not exist over an 
interval (in which case φ (0) >0 is obtained from the Phase 1 equation of motion, applicable at k*=0 ).   
[0,1]z∈ [0,1)z∈
17 For a formal proof of lim 0
t
m
t
k
t
w
k→∞
∂
=
∂
, see Galor and Weil (96). 
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Uniqueness / Multiplicity 
 
Given the conditions for existence are satisfied, multiple steady state equilibria may 
exist if the Phase 1 equation of motion is convex.  Figure 3 illustrates such a case.  As 
previously discussed, the convexity of ( )tkφ over the interval (0,k*) depends not only 
on the degree of complementarity between capital for mental labor, as found by Galor 
and Weil (1996), but also the degree of complementarity between child-care 
goods/services and maternal time.  Should ( )tkφ be convex over the interval (0,k*), a 
poverty trap (represented by the stable equilibrium 1k ) may emerge.  For the 
subsequent analysis, I deal with the case where there is no such low level steady state. 
 
Figure 3: Multiple equilibria 
 
kt+1
kt
45o
k2k*k1
φ(kt)
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4 Fertility dynamics 
 
Having established that capital per household (and the wage for mental labor) rise 
throughout Phase 1 and Phase 2 until eventually converging to steady state in Phase 2, 
we can explore the dynamics of fertility. 
 
Proposition 3: Throughout Phase 1, fertility necessarily rises with income per 
household.  
 
It follows from (19) that rising wages for mental labor boost household fertility, 
regardless of the degree of complementariy between goods and time.  Thus, growth in 
income per capita generates a baby boom during an era in which women do not 
participate in the paid labor force. 
 
Recall the household’s fertility decision comprises 2 stages.  The household 
1. chooses the cost minimizing or efficient time-goods input mix given the 
production possibilities; and then  
2. Apportions the husband’s income to children and savings given the efficient 
cost of child rearing.  
 
Figure 4 depicts cost minimization for Phase 1 at the point where the isoquant n1 
intersects the vertical constraint, z = 1.  The slope of the isocost line is (1 )mt tw β− .  
The wage for mental labor is sufficiently small that z* =1.  Specifically 
−
( )(1 1 1m atw x δ δ )tβ−< − − .  The isocost is flatter than the isoquant at the initial corner 
solution.18  That is, the household would lower the cost of child rearing if it were able 
to employ time input in excess of the women’s total time endowment. 
 
Consider a rise in the wage for mental labor that is not sufficient to induce women to 
enter the paid workforce.  In terms of the diagram, the rotation of the isocost from the 
relatively flat solid line to the slightly steeper broken line does not yield an interior 
solution.  The efficient goods-time input mix required to rear n1 pairs of children is 
unaltered. 
 
At the same time, an increase in the wage for mental labor eases the household’s 
budget constraint.  Due to a pure income effect, the demand for children (or, 
equivalently spending on child rearing goods) increases.  An upward shift in the 
isoquant to n2 depicts the corresponding scale effect in Figure 4. 
 
Recall that for capital per household to accumulate over time, xˆ  must rise. 
In addition to illustrating the baby boom in Phase 1, Figure 4 provides a diagrammatic 
proof that xˆ  rises with the wage for mental labor.  When time input is bounded above 
by 1, an increase in scale can only be met by raising goods input more than 
proportionate to the rise in n.  Hence, xˆ necessarily rises. 
 
 
                                                 
18 If the corner solution were a point of tangency, a rise in the wage for mental labour would imply a 
move to an interior solution and, therefore, a transition to Phase 2.   We want to analyse the 
implications of a rise in the wage for mental labour while the economy is in Phase 1. 
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Figure 4: The household’s child rearing production decision in Phase 1 
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Proposition 4 As income per household rises throughout Phase 2, fertility 
may either: 
1) decline monotonically; 
2) rise monotonically; or 
3) initially decline and then rise. 
 
Proof 
 
Referring to the Appendix, there exists a critical value of the wage for mental labor,  
 ( )
1/
( 1) /** 1
2 1
p
m t
t
ww
ε
εδ βδ
−
   
= −   
−  
ε  (29) 
such that 0 *u m m mt t tn w w w< ∀ < *∂ ∂ ; 0 *u m m mt t tn w w w> ∀ > *∂ ∂ .   
 
Let k** denote the level of capital per household, corresponding directly to wm** (as 
per (28)), sufficient to induce a baby bounce-back in Phase 2. 
 
Three possible cases arise: 
 
1) ( )* ** : 0 *,u mt t tk k k n w k k k< < ∂ ∂ < ∀ ∈  
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Thus, for a sufficiently large wm**, fertility declines monotonically throughout 
Phase 2.  Although the following section examines the determinants of wm**, 
consider, for the moment, the influence of the production share of maternal 
time in child-rearing.  As , , ensuring that in the limit the 
above inequality holds, since the steady state value of capital per household is 
finite.  That is, when time is the only input, fertility unambiguously falls with 
the wage for mental labor throughout Phase 2, confirming Galor and Weil 
(1996). 
1δ → **mw →∞
 
2) ( )* ** : 0 *,u mt t tk k k n w k k k= < ∂ ∂ > ∀ ∈  
 
Should the wage for mental labor needed to induce a baby bounce-back equal 
the wage needed to induce women to enter the paid labor force, fertility rises 
monotonically throughout Phase 2.  An instantaneous baby bounce-back, 
although possible, is unlikely.  We can infer from the time input only case that 
substitution to child-care goods and services is integral to a baby bounce-back 
eventuating.  Market substitutes for maternal time emerge in response to 
continuing cost pressures. 
 
3) * **k k k< <  
 
In this case, growth in capital (income) per household generates a non-
monotonic path in fertility throughout Phase 2: 
 
( ) ( )0 *, ** ; 0u m u mt t t t t tn w k k k n w k k k∂ ∂ < ∀ ∈ ∂ ∂ > ∀ ∈ **,  
 
Although a steep rise in the opportunity cost of maternal time causes an initial 
decline in fertility, further rises induce households to substitute out of maternal 
time, removing the pressure to reduce fertility and allowing the income effect 
to dominate.  This pattern of gradual rather than instantaneous substitution fits 
with observed trends.  For instance, early childhood care centers, non-existent 
a few decades ago, are now prevalent.  
 
Before investigating the factors underpinning wm**, we restate (29) so as to explore 
the intuition behind Proposition 4. 
 
Corollary As income per household rises throughout Phase 2, fertility declines if 
and only if the child rearing goods/time input ratio is sufficiently high. 
 
Proof  Referring to the Appendix, 0u mt tn w <∂ ∂  if and only if 
 [ ]
ˆ 1
ˆ 1 2
m p
t
t t
wx
z
εδ
1
tw
β δ β
 
−
= < 
− − 
 (30)19 
 
                                                 
19 Alternatively, this condition can be expressed as 2 ˆ tznγ < .  Hence the proposition: “If time spent in 
domestic child care is sufficiently small … fertility increases with the female wage” (p.7 Apps and 
Rees (2001)).   
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To abstract from the role of wage growth, for the moment, consider the limiting case, 
.  By assumption of fixed proportions the input ratio (left hand side of (30)) 
remains fixed.   
0ε →
 
This is the assumption made by Galor and Weil (1996) who note briefly that in this 
case, a rise in female relative wages “reduces fertility if xˆ  is not too large” (footnote 
12, Galor and Weil (1996)).20  Thus, the introduction of a second child rearing input, 
albeit in fixed proportions, is sufficient to demonstrate that fertility decline is not an 
inevitable consequence of rising female relative wages with economic growth.   
 
Nonetheless, the assumption of fixed proportions seems unnecessarily restrictive.  
Goods and time are unlikely to be perfect complements in the rearing of children.   
 
Moreover, only by restoring wages as a determinant of the goods/time ratio can we 
see why the negative relationship between household income and fertility will unravel 
over time, as in the third case of Proposition 4.   
 
The intuition lies in a comparison of substitution and income effects.  When both 
husband and wife work, female wages constitute a portion of household income.  A 
proportionate increase in the wage for mental labor results in a less than proportionate 
rise in household income.  To illustrate, if female wages are two thirds of male wages, 
a 10% rise in the wage for mental labor will increase household income by 8%. 
 
In the limiting case, , when maternal time is the only child rearing input, a 10% 
rise in mental wages will increase the cost of raising children by 10%.  Hence, given 
our functional forms for parental utility and for child rearing, the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect, and fertility necessarily declines.  However, when a 
second input is introduced, the cost of the wife’s time is only a portion of the total 
cost of child rearing, so that the income effect may now dominate.
1δ →
21 
 
In the limiting case of fixed input proportions, , both potential household 
income and the per unit cost of child rearing increase at a constant rate with wages 
growth.  Thus, if the substitution effect dominates the income effect at the beginning 
of Phase 2, further wages growth will not reverse the dominance.  However, when ε > 
0, the per unit cost of child rearing increases at a decreasing rate, whereas potential 
household income increases at a constant rate.  It follows that the income effect of 
rising female relative wages may eventually dominate the substitution effect so that 
fertility rises instead of declining. 
0ε →
 
Thus, when ε > 0, the very aspect of economic growth that discourages fertility, rising 
female relative wages, ultimately remedies fertility decline by raising the goods-time 
input ratio. 
                                                 
20 Clearly, by the corollary to Proposition 4, the conditions of Apps and Rees (2001) and Galor and 
Weil (1996) are equivalent. 
21 We can infer the likely response of fertility to a rise in female relative wages at a point in time from 
the composition of child rearing costs and household income.  To illustrate, Haveman and Wolfe 
(1995) provide lower and upper bound estimates of time’s share of the total cost of child rearing for the 
US in 1992: 18% and 73%, respectively.  Since the upper bound estimate approximates female 
earnings as a percentage of male earnings in the same year, we would expect fertility in the US to rise 
with female relative wages at that time. 
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We could simply append the previous discussion with the surmise that the goods-time 
input mix increases over time as higher wages induce households to switch goods and 
services for maternal time.  However, factors other than higher wages are also at play: 
households’ ability to substitute goods for time; the price of goods and services used 
in child rearing. 
 
Overlooked in existing literature, a CES production function for child rearing allows 
us to clearly identify the factors underpinning the child rearing input mix.  From this, 
we can demonstrate how changes in parameter values may either hasten or postpone 
the onset of a baby bounce-back. 
 
Proposition 5  A high rate of subsidy to child-care goods and services 
prolongs fertility decline in Phase 2, if the degree of complementarity between child-
care goods/services and time is relatively high. 
 
Proof 
 
Consider the case * **k k k< < . 
  
From (29), ** 0 1m tw β∂ ∂ > ⇔ ε < .  Since wm** is increasing over time, the 
higher wm**, the later the onset of a baby bounce-back. 
 
For the intuition on this result, note that the net price of goods and services used in 
child rearing appears on both sides of the inequality in (30).  Accordingly, a subsidy 
to child-care goods and services affects the fertility response to higher female relative 
wages in two ways:   
1. For a given goods-time input mix, a subsidy raises maternal time’s portion of 
the total cost of child rearing, accentuating the substitution effect that induces 
fertility decline;   
2. A subsidy lowers the net price of goods and services, prompting households to 
raise the goods-time input ratio (left hand side of (30)).  A higher goods-time 
input ratio weakens the substitution effect.   
Unless the input mix is highly responsive to changes in relative input prices, the first 
effect will dominate. 
   
Intuitively, when the degree of complementarity between child-care goods and 
services and maternal time is relatively high, subsidizing child-care goods and 
services has a negligible effect on the goods-time input mix.  Under these 
circumstances, a subsidy serves only to boost time’s share of the total cost of child 
rearing.  Accordingly, subsidization of child-care goods and services prolongs the 
decline in fertility due to rising female relative wages. 
 
A priori, we might expect subsidizing child-care goods and services would itself 
foster a baby bounce-back.  Note that Proposition 5 deals specifically with an indirect 
effect of subsidization. A high rate of subsidy implies a high wm**, thereby 
postponing the onset of a naturally occurring baby bounce-back induced by rising 
wages. 
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The partial derivatives of wm** with respect to other parameters are straightforward.  
In brief, the lower maternal time’s share in production (δ) or the lower the wage for 
physical labor, the earlier the onset of a baby bounce-back. 
 
For the intuition, recall that rising female relative wages boost fertility when the 
income effect dominates the substitution effect.  The lower δ, the smaller maternal 
time’s share of child rearing costs and hence, the weaker the substitution effect.  The 
lower the wage for physical labor, the greater female wages’ contribution to 
household income, amplifying the income effect.  
 
Referring to the Appendix, for given rates of subsidy and a given wage for physical 
labor, a higher elasticity of substitution hastens the onset of a baby bounce-back. 
 
Proposition 6  As income per household rises throughout Phase 2, rising 
female labor force participation is necessary but not sufficient for declining fertility. 
 
Proof 
 
Recall that female labor supply is given by 1 . ˆ tzn−
 
Necessity 
 
(0 *,u mt t tn w k k k∂ ∂ < ∀ ∈ )** , together with ˆ 0mtz w∂ ∂ < imply ˆ(1 ) 0mt tzn w∂ − ∂ <  
 
Sufficiency 
 
By (25), ˆ(1 ) 0mt tzn w∂ <∂ − , which need not imply declining fertility.  Provided 
**k k< , ( )0 *u mt t tn w k k k∂ ∂ > ∀ ∈ *, . 
 
In the limit as , 1δ → **k = ∞ > k  and we obtain the Galor and Weil (1996) 
result that rising female labor force participation is both necessary and sufficient for 
declining fertility.  Since time input per pair of children is fixed, the proof that rising 
female labor supply implies declining fertility is incidental.   
 
 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Joint evolution of population growth and income per 
household  
 
Household fertility and income evolve jointly according to the dynamic system 
explored in Section 3.  Figure 5 depicts the path of fertility in transition to a unique 
globally stable steady state, corresponding to k , in Phase 2.  t*, t** and t  denote the 
time periods after which, respectively, women enter the paid labor force, a baby 
bounce-back commences and the economy reaches steady state. 
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Figure 5(b) depicts the general results.  For contrast, Figure 5(a) depicts the limiting 
cases,  and , when maternal time cannot be substituted for child-care 
goods and services. 
1δ → 0ε →
 
Whilst allowing for the substitution of child-care goods and services for maternal time 
has striking implications for the path of fertility, a feature common to both Figure 5(a) 
and (b) is the dramatic change in pace of capital accumulation as the economy enters 
Phase 2.  The pace of capital accumulation slows as the economy nears the end of 
Phase 1.  On entering Phase 2, a boost to the supply of mental labor fuels an 
immediate take-off in growth.  There is a corresponding steep decline in fertility.  The 
pace of capital accumulation slows again as the economy approaches steady state.  
This pattern is a consequence of concavity of φ(kt) in both phases.  
 
In Figure 5(a), the time path for fertility derived for a given goods-time input ratio 
(ε =0) follows a similar path to that derived under the assumption of time input only 
(δ =0).  Overall, allowing for a fixed quantity of goods to be used in child rearing has 
no dramatic implications for the joint evolution of income per household and fertility. 
 
Compared with the time input only case, household capital and income is lower at any 
given time period in Phase 1, since spending on child rearing goods and services 
absorbs some household savings.  Accordingly, k* is lower.  That is, women enter the 
paid workforce at a lower income per capita.22   
 
In Phase 2, household savings is the same under either assumption, but the per unit 
cost of child rearing is higher when goods are an input.  Consequently, fertility is 
lower at any given time period.  Less capital dilution implies higher capital (income) 
per household.  Compared with the time input only case, the economy converges to a 
higher income per capita and lower fertility rate. 
 
Figure 5(b) depicts our richer, more general result of a non-monotonic path in 
fertility.   
 
As per Proposition 3, growth in income per household generates a baby boom in 
Phase 1.  Throughout Phase 1, the maternal time constraint is binding.  Because 
household time allocation is at a corner solution, a marginal change in household 
income has only an income effect and demand for children increases.  The rise in 
fertility becomes less pronounced as the economy nears the end of Phase 1, due to the 
concavity of the equation of motion. 
 
This contrasts Figure 5(a), where fertility is constant throughout Phase 1.  In either 
limiting case, because the household cannot substitute goods for maternal time, 
increases in household income are entirely absorbed in additional savings.  Since the 
maternal time constraint is binding, the assumption that maternal time input per pair 
of children is fixed constrains fertility to a constant, ˆ1tn = z
                                                
.  Thus, the introduction 
of child rearing goods is, in itself, not sufficient to generate a baby boom in Phase 1.  
Mothers need to be able to substitute goods for time. 
 
 
22See Section 3 for verification.   
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Phase 2, in Figure 5(b), begins with accelerated growth in capital (income) per 
household and a corresponding steep decline in fertility.  As per Proposition 4, the 
inverse relationship between income per household and fertility may break down 
before the economy converges to a steady state.  Rising female relative wages induce 
households to substitute child-care goods and services for maternal time.  Once the 
maternal time input in child rearing is sufficiently low, the effect of rising wages on 
the cost of children is offset by the income effect.  Thus, at time t**, fertility ceases to 
decline with growth in income per capita.  Any further rise in the wage for mental 
labor generates a baby bounce-back until the economy reaches steady state and 
fertility levels off because capital and income per household are no longer rising.   
 
This contrasts Figure 5 (a) where, so long as income per capita is rising, fertility must 
decline.  Of course, the path in Figure 5(a) is derived for a given goods-time input 
ratio.  By the Corollary to Proposition 4, fertility will cease to decline with growth in 
income per household if goods and services come to dominate child-care inputs.  
However, in the limiting case , the likely path of the goods-time ratio over time 
remains a conjecture insofar as the input mix is an exogenous variable. 
0ε →
 22
  
Figure 5: Evolution of capital per household and fertility 
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(b) CES production function for child rearing 
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5.2 Implications 
 
Given that advanced economies are currently moving through Phase 2, with 
increasing labor force participation by women, what inferences can we draw for 
current policy debates?  
 
As income per capita rises, what would the model presented in this paper predict? 
 
1. Female labor force participation rises unambiguously, albeit at a decreasing 
rate. 
 
2. Rising female labor force participation need not imply declining fertility. 
 
3. Fertility may cease to decline before the economy reaches zero growth in per 
capita income in steady state. 
 
4. Once fertility ceases to decline, any further wages growth generates a baby 
bounce-back. 
 
5. A high rate of subsidy to child-care goods and services may postpone the 
onset of a naturally occurring baby bounce-back. 
 
Policy 
 
Proposition 5 has interesting implications for policy if governments are alarmed at the 
implications of fertility declining below replacement rates.  Apps and Rees (2001) 
focus on the setting of child care subsidies and tax rates23 to boost fertility.  By 
confining their analysis to the comparative statics of steady state, in which income per 
capita is stationary, they forego a richer analysis of subsidies in light of rising female 
relative wages.  Specifically, reducing the cost of bought in child care postpones an 
upturn in fertility induced by wages growth if the degree of complementarity between 
such goods and services and maternal time is relatively high.  This suggests policy 
refocus on easing the substitutability of goods and services for time with, for example, 
more flexible child care / work arrangements. 
 
The proof accompanying the corollary to Proposition 4 identifies maternal time’s 
share of child rearing as equally important as the relative “price” of maternal time in 
determining the optimal child rearing input mix.  The higher the share of maternal 
time in child rearing, the more protracted is the fertility decline.  Policy effectiveness 
is limited to the extent that child rearing is inherently intensive in maternal time. 
 
Cross-country differences 
 
In addition to growth in female relative wages, the net price of child-care goods and 
services, maternal time’s share in child rearing and the degree of complementarity 
between child-care goods and time all influence the path of fertility. 
 
                                                 
23 The wage variable is easily amended to an after tax wage rate. 
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Differences in some of these parameter values could explain the purported cross-
country differences in fertility decline.  Across developed countries, the negative 
correlation between female labor supply and fertility does not seem to hold.  For 
example, in 2000, the US is the only country with above-replacement fertility rate 
despite having a high percentage of women in the labor force; Germany has one of the 
lowest fertility rates as well as the lowest percentage of women in the labor force.24  
  
However, rather than draw inferences from a snapshot in time, I examine the dynamic 
interplay between fertility decline and the percentage of women in the labor force.   
 
 
Figure 6: Selected G5 countries25 
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Source: World Bank Tables 
 
At first blush, Figure 6 supports a negative correlation between percentage of women 
in the labor force and fertility.  For instance, Germany started in 1960 with the highest 
percentage of women in the labor force and the lowest fertility rate.  Since then, a 
gradual rise in female labor force participation was met by a gradual decline in 
fertility. 
 
Supporting the breakdown of the negative correlation due to substitution of child-care 
goods and services for maternal time, since 1975 the percentage of women in the 
labor force rose whilst fertility leveled off in most countries.  In contrast to the UK, 
fertility experiences a final upturn in the US, despite both countries experiencing a 
similar rise in the percentage of women in the labor force. 
                                                 
24Central to the negative fertility-female relative wage correlation is the reallocation of time from 
market work to child rearing.  Participation rates may therefore be an inadequate correlate.  For 
example, a high participation rate could be consistent with a small aggregate labor supply if most 
women worked only several hours a week. 
25The selected countries depict the main cross-country differences.  The fertility and labor force trends 
of France and Japan mimic those of UK and Germany, respectively. 
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Forward projections 
 
Finally, forward projections of fertility decline should consider two questions:  Will 
female wages rise relative to male wages to the same extent in the future?  Has the 
wages growth to date caused households to substitute child-care goods and services 
for maternal time?  Galor and Weil (1996) consider the first question in isolation. 
They present a special case of our model: as , fertility must decline 
monotonically as income per capita rises in transition to steady state.  Once we 
consider the second question, predicted fertility may assume a non-monotonic path in 
transition to steady state.  This paper identifies the parameters central to answering the 
second question.  From this, we may predict different paths in fertility for different 
advanced countries.  We may also anticipate a baby bounce-back, to the extent that 
fertility ceased declining in most G5 countries, despite positive growth in per capita 
income.
1δ →
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 6 Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, the model presented in this paper generates a non-monotonic path in 
fertility for a developed economy moving through two phases, distinguished by a 
dramatic rise in female labor force participation. 
 
As income per household grows, fertility: 
 
• initially rises during the first phase when women allocate their total time 
endowment to child rearing;  
 
• then declines as women enter the paid work force; and 
 
• then may bounce-back. 
 
In contrast to previous models, the inverse relationship between fertility and per 
capita income over the latter phase unravels over time.  Rising female relative wages 
induce households to substitute child-care goods and services for maternal time, 
alleviating the cost pressure to reduce fertility.  Once the wage for mental labor 
reaches a critical level, fertility ceases to decline with growth in income per capita.  
Any further rise in female relative wages causes an upturn in fertility. 
 
Whilst the resemblance of the generated path in fertility to the G5 data illustrated in 
Figure 1 is compelling, I do not deny the importance of social and political changes in 
developed economies over this period.  Arguably, some of these changes, such as the 
emancipation of women, are linked to growth in income per capita.  Bongaarts (1999) 
offers a novel non-economic explanation for fluctuations in fertility.  He argues that 
sudden changes in the mean age of child bearing distort measured fertility rates.  A 
fall in the mean age of child bearing following World War II meant that births of 
successive cohorts overlapped in the same period, boosting observed fertility.  
Conversely, a rise in the mean age of child bearing over recent decades deflated 
observed fertility.  However, after adjusting fertility rates for this distortion, van 
Imhoff and Keilman (2000) still found a remarkable baby boom-bust sequence. 
 
Some interesting policy implications arise.  A concomitant rise in fertility and female 
relative wages when women are in the labor force challenges the belief that reversing 
current fertility trends necessitates a reduction in female labor force participation.  Of 
course, child-care goods and services must be sufficiently substitutable for maternal 
time for the rise in fertility to occur without a drop in female labor force participation.  
Traditional policies designed to eradicate declining fertility may have perverse 
effects.  High rates of subsidy to child-care goods and services may postpone the 
onset of a fertility upturn induced by rising female relative wages. 
  
Overall, introducing a CES production function for child rearing to Galor and Weil 
(1996) yields a rich dynamic interplay between fertility and income per capita.  This 
paper makes an important contribution to endogenous fertility literature by both 
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generating a baby boom without resorting to an outdated Malthusian assumption and 
challenging the projection of the recent baby bust into the future. 
 
It would be useful to extend the analysis in several directions, such as recognizing 
human capital accumulation as central to the wages story as well as parental choice 
over fertility.  Considerable richness and realism would be gained by drawing on the 
R&D based models of endogenous growth of Romer (1990) and Jones (1995).  Both 
identify population, in level and growth rates, respectively, as the key determinant of 
technological progress.  Galor and Weil (2000) incorporate endogenous fertility into a 
descriptive model of endogenous growth inspired by Romer (1990).  Nesting 
endogenous fertility within a well-specified model of R&D is a feasible and 
challenging direction for future research. 
 29
APPENDIX 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
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Proof of Proposition 4 
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Proof accompanying discussion of Proposition 5 
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